broad definition of lawmaking, including regulatory and other normative institutional output. 13 Recent research projects underline that a focus on traditional formal law enacted by traditional international organizations would amount to a far too limited perspective on institutional lawmaking.
14 Finally, institutional lawmaking hardly takes place on a 'stand-alone' basis: formal and informal international norms are increasingly connected, and norms are adopted or referred to by other international bodies, resulting in an unprecedented global institutionalized normative web.
15
In this chapter we will approach institutional lawmaking with these developments in mind.
Section 2 will first assess the lawmaking functions of traditional international organizations and will also further clarify the notion of institutional lawmaking itself. Section 3 will focus on possible lawmaking functions of other international bodies and in doing so will point to the wide variety of bodies and networks active in lawmaking processes. Both sections lead us to a concluding part (section 4) in which we underline the interconnectedness between different international norms originating in distinct formal and informal bodies and networks. Implicitly, this section calls for a broader understanding of institutional lawmaking to allow us to take full account of a rich institutional normative output.
LAWMAKING BY INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Defining Institutional Lawmaking
International organizations can be defined in many ways. We follow Schermers and Blokker:
'international organizations are defined as forms of cooperation (1) founded on an international agreement; (2) having at least one organ with a will of its own; and (3) established under international law'. On the basis of this definition we can count somewhere between 500-700 international organizations, 16 ranging from more general ones such as the United Nations or the World Trade
Organization to organizations in a specific area, such as the International Coffee Organization or the International Network on Bamboo and Rattan. While many international organizations were set-up as frameworks to allow states to institutionalize cooperation in a specific field, decisions of international 13 Including international agreements to which the international organization itself becomes a party, although from an institutional lawmaking' perspective this is mainly interesting when the role of the international organization in the negotiating process can clearly be distinguished from the role of the states. 14 See in particular the leading study by Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-Makers (n 2); but also J organizations are increasingly considered a source of international law. 17 Indeed, this seems to lie behind the term institutional lawmaking. Thus, Klabbers defined lawmaking instruments as instruments 'laying down more or less general abstract rules of general application, binding upon all subjects of a given legal system'. These instruments would be different from those that are merely 'applying the law', acts of a 'household nature' and 'acts which [aim] to influence behaviour, but without creating law'. 18 It has even become quite common to regard these types of acts as contributing to the development of 'world legislation'. Over the past decade, the use of the term legislation in this context was triggered in particular by the adoption of a number of resolutions by the UN Security Council, which aimed at a certain 'harmonisation' of domestic rules worldwide, rather than at regulating a concrete situation. The idea behind the term 'legislation' is that 'the consent of states need not always be decisive, and may at times be overruled for the sake of the interests of mankind '. 19 Yet, a clear consensus on how to interpret these notions is still lacking. 20 While some are quite generous in granting legislative powers to international organizations, 21 others would stress the idea that in the end it would be the member states that are in charge, which would make the term 'legislation' (as a top-down instrument) inappropriate.
At the same time it is very difficult to define the broader notion of institutional lawmaking as its development differs from one organization to another and presents itself in various shapes.
22
Moreover, despite its current topical nature, international lawyers were quite late in recognizing an 'emerging reality of global governance' and the 'organization of global rulemaking'. 23 
LAWMAKING BY OTHER INTERNATIONAL BODIES
New Forms of Institutional Lawmaking
In studying institutional lawmaking it became clear that many norms originate in other international bodies or form part of a much broader international debate, including many different actors. The emerging picture is one of a broad range of international normative fora, from intergovernmental organizations with a broad mandate (see above), treaty-based conferences that do not amount to an Three elements in particular make it difficult for traditional international law to grasp the developments and to translate everything into legal terms. The decision-making processes that result in normative or regulatory activity in these forums likewise seem to be very diverse. They differ, for instance, on the issue as to who can take the initiative and formulate proposals for decisions (governments, organs of the organization, interest groups, independent experts), the format wherein proposals are discussed (organization of negotiations, formal and informal sessions, caucuses, negotiating groups, amendments, etc.), and the actual decision-making mode (consensus, voting by unanimity or by a certain type of majority, equality or inequality of voting power, methods of voting), including the question of which actors and stakeholders (eg organs of the organization, governments, civil society organizations, businesses, parliamentarians, etc.) are involved -directly, or indirectly, formally or informally -in the decision-making.
At least as diverse seem the instruments used within these various regulatory forums. These range from 'hard law' to 'soft law', exchange of best practices and benchmarking, to mutual recognition and even to tools that at first sight may not seem normative in nature but that can have such effect, such as policy programmes, modes of assessment, reporting and monitoring systems, and loan conditionality. 42 The degree to which such international regulatory regimes are binding is linked with both the character of the instruments and procedures aimed at implementation and compliance.
Rules, standards and principles can be included in traditional, legally binding conventions, negotiated between states or in the framework of an international organization, or can have the status of technical annexes to such conventions, to be amended through simplified procedures; but they can also take One approach is to include bodies at the global level that play a role in international or transnational lawmaking, irrespective of the fact that they cannot be captured by the traditional definition of subjects of international law. That is, they are not states and do not fall within the traditional definition of an international organization and/or often lack international legal personality.
What makes things even more complicated is that some of these bodies generate norms, such as best standards, practices, guidelines, and so forth that affect a wide range of countries, companies and people, without being considered formal sources of international law. Irrespective of the legal status of the norms that are the product of these non-traditional bodies, there is some agreement on the idea that the norms and rules produced by these bodies (or networks) contribute to institutional lawmaking. 44 Recently, this phenomenon was approached by coining it informal international lawmaking (INLAW) INLAW is defined as:
"cross-border cooperation between public authorities, with or without the participation of private actors and/or international organizations, in a forum other than a traditional international organization (process informality), and/or as between actors other than traditional diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) (actor informality) and/or which does not result in a formal treaty or traditional source of international law (output informality On the basis of the insights offered by these projects, this section will broaden the scope of international institutions that are (or may be) engaged in lawmaking by introducing three new categories: international institutions in which states cooperate on a more informal basis (the G20 being the prime example); international bodies created by international organizations (termed here 'international agencies'); and informal international bodies composed of other actors ('institutionalised networks').
Informal Institutional Lawmaking
States not only cooperate in the framework of formal international organizations, but have also established more informal bodies. 51 The question addressed here is to what extent these bodies play a role in institutional lawmaking. Given the vast amount of international bodies, we will only be able to highlight an example: the 'Group of 20' (or G20 shifted from enacting measures against the worst effects of the financial crisis, to topics ranging from the reform of the international monetary system to climate change and commodity price volatility.
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Compared to traditional international organizations, the G20 resembles a loosely organized network or informal gathering. Meetings take place in different locations, there are no procedural rules and its output is anything but a treaty or any other form of traditional international law.
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With its characteristics of a network, the question may be whether the G20 can be considered a 'body' that as such plays a role in institutional lawmaking. The fact is that the outcomes of G20
meetings cannot be ignored and affect and influence other international decisions. 56 As illustrated by Wouters and Geraets, the G20 is currently made up of seven advanced economies, 12 emerging economies and the EU. 57 The membership thus comprises five continents, two-thirds of the world's population, roughly 85 per cent of global GDP and approximately 80 per cent of world trade. The broadening of the agenda led to the fact that G20 meetings now take place not only at the level of heads of state or ministers of finance, but also at the level of specialized ministries.
Given the explicit informal nature of the G20, it remains difficult, however, to view the conclusions of the meetings as 'lawmaking'. This is not to say that the G20 does not play a role in the global lawmaking process. As argued by Martinez-Diaz and Woods, 58 the G20 outcomes effect decisionmaking by other international organizations in three different ways: 1. a 'complementary effect' will generate political support for the decision-making process in international organizations, thereby pressurizing them to accelerate their initiatives; 2. a 'competitive effect', whereby certain formal bodies such as the International Monetary and Finance Committee (IMFC) of the IMF and the Development Committee of the World Bank now compete with the G20 as the latter tries to gain authority on these matters; and 3. the G20 may have a 'rebalancing effect' in global governance and international organizations. It brings emerging economies into agenda-setting and coordination 'discussions and it may serve "as a catalyst for reform of formal international organizations"'.
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While the G20 is a prominent example of an informal international body (in International
Relations theory probably referred to as an 'international regime') with clear normative functions, others have a more formal basis. One may think of international committees which may be intergovernmental but may also consist exclusively of independent experts that have their basis in multilateral treaties, such as the UN human rights treaty bodies. 60 In terms of institutional lawmaking bodies such as the G20 therefore contribute to lawmaking indirectly. They serve as a forum for state representatives to draw conclusions on broad issues of global governance, thereby influencing actual lawmaking by other fora.
Delegated Institutional Lawmaking
Lawmaking activities can also be discovered in international bodies that are neither based on a treaty nor on a bottom-up cooperation between national regulators, but on a decision by an international 1981-1992' (1996) In terms of lawmaking, the powers granted to these international bodies are often constructed and rules applying to decision-making. Their sources include treaties and general principles of public international law. More often, however, administrative law mechanisms are established by non-treaty lawmaking of the parent organizations as well as of international agencies per se, including soft law measures. As for their content, the emerging administrative law principles and rules tend to converge around decisional transparency, procedural participation and reasoned decisions, while review by a court or other independent tribunal is normally excluded. In particular, international agencies develop a practice of transparency by releasing, generally on their websites, administrative decisions, information on which they are based and material on internal decision-making. Moreover, participation in decision-making proceedings has been promoted. Notably, procedural guarantees are designed as rights of states and are granted to all member states, not only to those directly affected by regulatory decisions. Procedural guarantees are extended to civil society and private actors, although their effective role in the decision-making process is contested and their formal rights are often more limited than those granted to states.
Lawmaking by Networking
In some issue areas there is intense cooperation between state and non-state actors. Apart from the obvious example of the International Labour Organization, other well-known examples include the Codex Alimentarius Commission on food safety or to ICANN, which governs the internet. ICANN does not regulate on the basis of binding decisions. Rather, it concludes contracts with the registries in charge of the administration of internet 'top-level domains' (TLDs). However, given the fact that internet access is dependent on having a TLD name (such as .eu), one may argue that this comes close to 'de facto' bindingness. Indeed 'It seems quite logical that the uniformity of the rules is best guaranteed by a single "legislator"'.
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In some areas states have even ceased to play a role and transnational actors have taken over.
A prime example is the International Standardization Organization (ISO), which by now has produced some 20,000 rules on the standardization of products and processes, covering almost all aspects of technology and business from food safety to computers, and agriculture to healthcare. 72 These rules are often adopted by other international organizations, such as the WTO, which allows them to indirectly affect national legal orders. 73 A similar situation arises in relation to the norms set by the In a chapter on institutional lawmaking, the question may rightfully be raised to which extend trans-governmental regulatory networks are institutionalized. Again, there is a great variety: while some may be extremely unstructured, some have become more institutionalized and may resemble an international organization. 84 The latter is in particular the case in harmonization networks such as Basel, IOSCO and the ICH that are highly institutionalized, and could rightfully be considered transgovernmental regulatory organizations (TROs). 85 They have many of the characteristics commonly associated with an organization. As far as their contribution to 'lawmaking' is concerned, the documents issued by harmonization networks are typically considered not legally binding. legal orders as part of European law. But international decisions may also have an independent impact on domestic legal orders. This is not to say that all international decisions have a direct effect in the sense we are familiar with in EU law. From the point of view of international law, while 'primacy is a matter of logic as international law can only assume its role of stabilizing a global legal order if it supersedes particular and local rules', at the same time it 'allows for an undefined variety of combinations based either upon the doctrine of monism or the doctrine of dualism'. the international legal order, the legitimacy of the decisions or the accountability of the actors -the answering of which goes beyond the scope of this chapter.
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3. The distinction between formal and informal institutions and networks may have been helpful for lawyers to define their object of study, but no longer does justice to the interconnectedness of the norms they produce. Indeed, as has been observed, the institutions involved in global governance 'interact, formally and informally on a regular basis. In recent years, their programs are more tied together, creating linkages that begin to weave a web of transnational rules and regulations'.
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In a way, this third point is the result of the first two. Hence, the main lesson may be that institutional lawmaking (as well as the enforcement of the rules 98 ) cannot be studied by looking at one particular international institution or merely at traditional international organizations. Norms enacted by formal and informal international bodies and networks are more often interconnected and, given the increasing (technological) complexity of many issues, the origin of a norm may very well be found in a meeting of one of the hundreds of international bodies and networks that exist internationally as part of an institutionalized global normative web. 96 See also Klabbers, 'Law-making and Constitutionalism' (n 31), 12, arguing that non-state actors have 'started
